All the uncertainties surrounding the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal

There are no guarantees that the ceasefire will last beyond the first phase, nor that the humanitarian response will be effective in the coming months or that reconstruction efforts will begin

Guest post by Roberto Iannuzzi, originally published in Italian on his Substack.

---

The increasingly persistent rumours of an imminent ceasefire agreement in Gaza culminated on Wednesday in what appeared to be an official confirmation from several parties involved in the negotiations of a finalised deal.

American, Israeli, Egyptian and Qatari officials corroborated the news. But the still-uncertain nature of the agreement, after months of discussions about imminent agreements that never materialised, was confirmed by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself with his repeated statements contradicting those of the official mediators.

In the hours following the announcement of the agreement, Netanyahu repeatedly stated that the understanding was not complete, that some details were still being worked out, and that the Israeli government would have to definitively approve it.

After accusing Hamas of putting forward new proposals not foreseen in the agreement, he himself later imposed new conditions, such as not withdrawing Israeli troops from the Philadelphia Corridor on the border between Gaza and Egypt during the first phase of the ceasefire, as had been agreed.

Trump’s counteroffers

The Israeli prime minister’s recalcitrant attitude stems from the fact that, by all appearances, he was pushed to accept a ceasefire against his will — by none other than the incoming US president Donald Trump.

After winning the presidential elections, Trump had boldly declared that he wanted the release of all Gaza hostages by January 20, the date of his inauguration at the White House, or else “hell” would break loose in the Middle East.

Such threats seemed directed at Hamas, but a considerable portion of the pressure was also aimed at the Israeli prime minister. Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, traveled directly to Israel demanding to meet Netanyahu in person.

According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, when Netanyahu’s staff resisted, arguing that diplomatic meetings could not be organised on the Sabbath, Witkoff curtly replied that he did not care what day of the week it was, that he was on his way, and that they needed to ensure Netanyahu’s presence.

According to Ronen Bergman, a journalist with significant contacts in the Mossad, Trump also made several counteroffers to the Israeli prime minister: the potential lifting of sanctions imposed on the Israeli company NSO, creator of the Pegasus spyware that allowed Saudi Arabia to track journalist Jamal Khashoggi before his assassination; relentless opposition to the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant; and efforts to protect Israeli military officials accused of war crimes in foreign countries.

Most importantly, Trump reportedly offered to support Israel if it decided to resume military operations and end the ceasefire. This would also be possible due to the relative ambiguity of the agreement’s text.

Such offers were confirmed by Marco Rubio, the future Secretary of State in Trump’s administration, who also promised to annul sanctions imposed by the Biden administration on settlers responsible for acts of violence in the West Bank.

Mike Waltz, the future National Security Advisor in the new administration, added that “Israel needs to know that if the [Israeli army] is required to enter Gaza again, we are with them”, emphasising that “Hamas is not going to continue as a military entity, and it is certainly not going to govern Gaza”.

As for Trump’s goals with this ceasefire agreement, some argue it is primarily a propaganda move to discredit the outgoing administration and ensure a triumphant inauguration on January 20.

Others, including Waltz, claim the new president is determined to reshape the Middle East, particularly by completing the Abraham Accords with the normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

To achieve this, ending hostilities in Gaza is a necessary but likely insufficient condition. The creation of an independent Palestinian state, repeatedly demanded by Riyadh as a prerequisite for normalisation, appears to be a distant prospect under current conditions.

The content of the agreement

The ceasefire agreement reached is structurally ambiguous. It is divided into three phases, each intended to lay the groundwork for the next.

As journalist Zvi Bar’el observed in Haaretz, such an agreement structure favours the implementation of the first phase (or the first two) at the expense of the later ones, crucial for ending the conflict.

The plan essentially mirrors the one proposed by the Biden administration in May 2024 and already accepted by Hamas. For this reason, the outgoing administration has sought to claim credit for the agreement.

However, the fact that it was only now accepted by Netanyahu’s government confirms that Biden chose not to exert significant pressure on the Israeli government.

The first phase, lasting 42 days, includes suspending hostilities starting Sunday, January 19, partially withdrawing Israeli forces to a buffer zone about 700 meters within Gaza’s borders, and releasing 33 civilian hostages (elderly, women and children) in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons.

No prominent Palestinian leaders will, however, be released, according to a last-minute condition imposed by Israel.

Palestinian civilians (not combatants) displaced from northern Gaza will be allowed to return (on foot along the coastal road) to the areas they left, although their homes have been destroyed.

Six hundred humanitarian aid trucks (including 50 carrying fuel) will enter the Strip daily. The Rafah crossing will reopen under Egyptian control.

During the first phase, negotiations will address the implementation of the second phase. During the latter, the remaining hostages (including soldiers) are expected to be released in exchange for additional Palestinian prisoners, a permanent ceasefire, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.

The third phase envisages exchanging the remains of bodies held by both sides and initiating reconstruction in Gaza under the supervision of various countries and international organisations, including Egypt, Qatar and the United Nations.

However, the modalities of reconstruction and the contentious issue of Gaza’s administration remain undefined.

Why the agreement risks failing

As evident, the phases are structured in increasing complexity, and as they progress, the likelihood of negotiations over implementation details failing increases.

According to the Associated Press, the agreement includes no written guarantees that the ceasefire will continue until an agreement on such details is reached. Many observers believe there is a risk that Israeli military operations will resume after the first phase, once most civilian hostages have been released.

Hamas remains the sole political and administrative authority in Gaza. The American proposal to extend the administration of a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza has so far been rejected by the Israeli government, has not been adequately coordinated with the Gulf monarchies that could finance the reconstruction, and faces the challenge of reforming a clientelist and ossified organisation like the PA.

On the other hand, Hamas’s continued governance in Gaza would mark the failure of Israel’s strategic objectives in the conflict. Despite the immense destruction in Gaza, the Palestinian Islamic movement remains strong, even recruiting new members to replace losses.

For Israel, the conflict has caused a slow but steady drain on soldiers and military resources. After such an economically and humanly costly war, leaving Hamas in control of Gaza would certify the failure of Netanyahu’s military strategy and likely end his political career.

The prime minister also risks weakening his government if the ceasefire is implemented. Ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have threatened to leave the government if the agreement becomes a reality.

Smotrich has stated that he would only approve such a “bad and dangerous” agreement if Israel could resume military operations after the initial 42-day phase.

Netanyahu is also aware that although opposition parties will support him on the ceasefire, they will not back him on other issues, while his legal problems will resurface if hostilities are prolonged.

The UNRWA’s fate hangs by a thread

Another uncertainty affecting the truce and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza concerns the fate of UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees.

On October 28, the Israeli Knesset passed two laws effectively barring UNRWA from operating in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza starting on January 28.

These laws are part of a campaign promoted by the Israeli government following Hamas’s attack on October 7, aiming ultimately to dismantle this UN agency.

To date, however, UNRWA remains the cornerstone of all assistance to Palestinians. It handles the entire logistics of aid to Gaza and serves as the primary and irreplaceable partner of other organisations operating in the Strip.

In the West Bank, UNRWA provides healthcare and education to 900,000 Palestinians. If the agency shuts down, food, medical care and schooling will vanish for tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza and other occupied territories.

In Gaza, even if the ceasefire continues, the humanitarian crisis would worsen catastrophically, with tens of thousands at risk of starvation.

During his first term, Trump cut American funding to UNRWA, and there are no guarantees he will pressure Israel to block the implementation of the above-mentioned laws this time.

No guarantees

The uncertainties surrounding Gaza’s future are enormous. There are no guarantees that the ceasefire will last beyond the first phase, nor that the humanitarian response will be effective in the coming months or that reconstruction efforts will begin.

The third phase of the agreement, which involves beginning reconstruction and defining a governing authority in Gaza, is the one Netanyahu and his far-right allies in the Israeli government will be most tempted to sabotage.

Once all, or most, hostages are freed, public attention in Israel and the US toward Gaza will wane.

At that point, the key question will be what Trump will allow Netanyahu’s government to do. If the new president genuinely wants to promote normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, he cannot give Netanyahu free rein.

However, excessive pressure on Netanyahu might cost Trump the support of his Christian Zionist base and wealthy Republican donors like Miriam Adelson.

For his part, the Israeli prime minister will likely try not to alienate the incoming American president early in his term. Yet, he may believe he can initially accommodate the White House to gain more freedom to impose Israeli strategic interests in the Middle East later.

---

Thanks for reading. Putting out high-quality journalism requires constant research, most of which goes unpaid, so if you appreciate my writing please consider upgrading to a paid subscription if you haven’t already. Aside from a fuzzy feeling inside of you, you’ll get access to exclusive articles and commentary.

Thomas Fazi

Website: thomasfazi.net

Twitter: @battleforeurope

Latest book: The Covid Consensus: The Global Assault on Democracy and the Poor—A Critique from the Left (co-authored with Toby Green)