Is Trump backtracking on Ukraine?

The president-elect has already pushed back his campaign pledge to end the war in Ukraine "in 24 hours"

According to a recent Financial Times article, “US president-elect Donald Trump has pushed back his campaign pledge to end the war in Ukraine in ‘24 hours’ to several months, in a shift European partners have interpreted as a sign that his administration will not immediately abandon support for Kyiv”.

Two European officials told the Financial Times that discussions with Trump’s incoming team in recent weeks revealed they had not yet decided on how to solve the conflict, and that support to Ukraine would continue after the US president’s inauguration on January 20.

“The whole [Trump] team is obsessed with strength and looking strong, so they’re recalibrating the Ukraine approach”, said one of the officials.

Trump’s team also fears that their actions may be compared to the “catastrophic withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan” under Joe Biden, which is something the Trump camp would not like to see repeated in Ukraine, the official added.

Last week, Trump suggested that “six months” was a more realistic target to end the war. His appointee as special envoy for the war in Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, told Fox News that the aim was to stop the conflict in “100 days”.

Meanwhile, according to the FT, European leaders have been pressuring Trump to continue providing US military to Ukraine in order “to put Kyiv in a stronger position for peace talks” — the same “peace through strength” argument we’ve been hearing for years, which has simply resulted in a constant worsening of Ukraine’s negotiating position.

French officials said last month that strengthening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield meant stopping Russia’s advances in the east of the country — even though the evolution of the situation on the battlefield suggests Ukraine can do little to stop Russia’s advances. Meanwhile, Macron has suggested that European troops could be deployed to Ukraine, even though the idea lacks unanimous support in Europe.

Even more ominously, Trump’s nominee for national security advisor Mike Waltz recently told ABC News that Ukraine should go “all in” and lower its draft age from 25 to 18:

The other thing we are going to need to see is really stabilising things on the battlefield. And one of the things we’ll be asking of the Ukrainians is, they have real manpower issues. Their draft age right now is 26 years old [it is actually 25], not 18. I don’t think a lot of people realise that they could generate hundreds of thousands of new soldiers. So, when we hear about morale problems when we hear about issues on the front line. Look, if the Ukrainians have asked the entire world to be all in for democracy, we need them to be all in for democracy.

This is how the Ukrainian journalist Leonid Ragozin commented the news on X:

Apart from the sheer immorality of the demand and its potentially catastrophic impact on Ukraine’s demography, it means that the war can’t be possibly finished within months as Trump administration hopes.

It will take many months before the young draftees get to the frontline after being caught by press gangs and trained. If they are sent to the West for training, many will simply run away as happened with Anna Kyivska brigade in France recently.

The effect on social stability is hard to predict — people are on the edge already, while the effect on the battlefield might be short-lived as evident from Ukraine’s demographic pyramid. As a reminder, Russia hasn’t resorted to forced mobilisation since a one-off surge in the autumn of 2022.

The Financial Times article, as well as Waltz’s comments, corroborate the argument I made in a recent article for UnHerd, where I explained why it was unlikely that Trump would be able to work out a peace deal anytime soon, mainly due to pressure from the pro-war factions in the US and in Europe as well as his own fear of “losing face” and ideological blind spots:

The mere fact that negotiations are now on the table is a welcome development in a war that has already caused immense bloodshed and triggered massive economic and geopolitical tectonic shifts. However, despite making bold claims during his election campaign that he would end the war “in 24 hours”, resolving the conflict is likely to prove very challenging — as Trump himself now admits.

The main hurdle is that the West’s relentless push for an impossible Ukrainian victory against a much stronger opponent has strengthened Russia’s hand. By rejecting earlier opportunities for negotiation — when Ukraine was in a stronger position — Western leaders have allowed Russia to consolidate its military gains, leaving little incentive for Putin to compromise.

In this sense, the belief that the West can achieve at the negotiating table what it failed to secure on the battlefield is, as political realist John Mearsheimer has argued, a dangerous illusion. “To win at the negotiating table, you have to win on the battlefield”, he explained, “and it’s the Russians who are winning on the battlefield.” Putin’s own words at his end-of-year conference underscore this: “The Russian army is advancing along the entire front line… We are moving towards resolving the main objectives that we set at the beginning of the military operation”.

Ukraine — and the West — face a difficult decision: either accept Putin’s terms, or endure the continuation of the war, which will further weaken Ukraine’s position (while causing countless more lives to be lost for nothing).

The real problem for Trump will be selling an agreement on Russia’s terms inside the US, where he is likely to face massive pushback from the pro-war establishment, including the neocons in his own party. They will try to weaponise Trump’s “America First” rhetoric against him by claiming — as they are already doing — that this would be a “humiliation” for the US.

Trump’s vision of a “quick fix” in the form of a ceasefire or truce, pending a more comprehensive agreement, is also unlikely to succeed. Putin believes a prolonged ceasefire would merely allow Ukraine to rearm and prepare for a renewed offensive; his scepticism is rooted in his perception of the Minsk agreements as a Western ploy to buy Ukraine time to pursue a military solution. And Western commentary has done little to dispel such fears. One recent RUSI article proposed using a “frozen ceasefire” à la North and South Korea to heavily arm a diminished Ukraine, transforming it into a more effective bulwark against Russia in the future. Such proposals all but guarantee Moscow’s resistance to any short-term, half-botched agreements.

The deeper challenge here lies in navigating the profound mistrust between Russia and the West. This demands a fundamental shift in the West’s approach: abandoning its (failed) attempts to isolate and weaken Russia, and taking genuine steps to address Russia’s security concerns. This is why Putin has emphasised that a comprehensive peace deal must include the removal of all sanctions against Russia.

Achieving such a geopolitical grand bargain, though, would require an all-out paradigm shift, in which the West relinquishes its pursuit of dominance and recognises the multipolar nature of global power dynamics. Yet, no Western leader — including Trump — seems prepared to make this leap. Despite potential shifts in priorities, such as focusing on Latin America and Iran, the strategic underpinnings of US policy are unlikely to change significantly under Trump’s leadership. There is little to suggest a fundamental departure from the US’s current strategy of aggressively countering the decline of American global dominance through diplomatic, economic and even military pressure.

Trump’s recent statements about annexing Greenland (as well as the Panama Canal) confirm this, as I wrote elsewhere:

[This] points to an attempt to deal with America’s declining global status and unsustainable imperial overreach. It all suggests the recalibrating of US priorities toward a more manageable “continental” strategy — a new Monroe Doctrine — aimed at reasserting full hegemony over what it deems to be its natural sphere of influence, the Americas and the northern Atlantic. This approach would attempt to balance those imperialist tendencies still very much present among the US establishment (and in Trump himself) with a more “realist” understanding of the world’s multipolar dynamics.

On this point — i.e., the unlikelihood of Trump being able to break away from the US’s “transhistorical” imperialist drive — I came across an interesting interview with Sergei Kisljak, former Russian ambassador to Washington and current senator in the Russian Federation Council, to the Hungarian portal Moszkvater, which I took the trouble of translating into English:

Many people believe that Donald Trump’s victory will fundamentally change global processes. Is this expectation an exaggeration? Do you agree with those who urge caution and warn that there are too many illusions about Trump’s return to the White House?

I have the impression that analysts generally place too much emphasis on which party will provide the US president. You see, presidents come and go, but the global interests of the United States remain the same. So what is constant and what is the biggest problem in Washington’s relations with many countries is that Americans see themselves as a special nation. They make no secret of this and speak openly about wanting to control the whole world. This mentality has manifested itself with remarkable simplicity in the policies of the current Democratic administration.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said on more than one occasion that the United States must lead the world because not doing so would run counter to Washington’s interests and weaken American hegemony. It follows that the United States must dominate the world. The Biden administration considers this a dogma, and so this thinking fundamentally shapes US foreign policy. This is a serious problem, especially because the United States, of course, has enormous financial, economic and military power. It has about 800 foreign bases, mainly near Russia and China, but the world is changing, the balance of power is changing.

Do you think Washington doesn’t understand this or doesn’t want to understand it?

The United States understands it very well. It is clear that the economic centre of the world is no longer the United States, and even less so Europe. The centre of gravity has shifted to Asia, and Africa and Latin America will become increasingly important in the future. The centre of growth today is Asia, we can see that very clearly, and of course Asia itself is aware of this, as are the countries of the so-called Global South. The shift in the economic centre of gravity means that these countries are also demanding greater influence on world affairs. They are therefore demanding a role in the UN and other international organisations that corresponds to their increased weight. They have every moral right to do so, and the new realities demand it.

The BRICS countries also want a fairer system, based on mutual respect rather than exploitation of others, that more closely reflects this new balance of power. I do not know whether this model, as envisaged by the BRICS countries, will be the basis for a multipolar world order, but it is clear that more than anything else it corresponds to the transformation of the world, to the new realities.

In this context, it is important to note that the BRICS are not forming against the West, but I would say that this part of the world is the non-West. Coming back to the United States, this process is very well understood in Washington, but such a reshaping of the world order is perceived as a threat to its global position.

Understandably, because the United States wants to maintain its hegemonic role at all costs…

That is why they are not ready to cooperate in the search for a fairer world order. They cannot and do not want to free themselves from the mentality that arose in the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has remained the only global superpower. So they are resorting to all means of pushing back — NATO, sanctions, interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This is nothing new, at most the level of arrogance has increased.

In a way, this is understandable, because they feel that their hegemony is weakening. In twenty years, the Chinese economy will be about one and a half times the size of the United States’, which by then it will have been overtaken by India. The West, led by the United States, is doing everything it can to oppose this objective process, to slow it down, and this attitude will continue to create tensions in the future. A particularly aggressive example of this is the creation of a violent anti-Russian state out of Ukraine. We see where this has led.

Do you think Donald Trump will succeed in at least freezing this conflict?

Just think about what freezing the conflict really means. It means further arming and strengthening Ukraine.

That is why this idea of ​​an agreement is hardly acceptable for Russia. Am I right?

Both the Russian president and the foreign minister have repeatedly stated the conditions under which Moscow is ready to end the conflict. Vladimir Putin made this clear in a speech to senior Foreign Ministry officials in June 2024. Nothing has changed since then. Moreover, it is clear that Russia is not interested in freezing the conflict, but in eliminating the causes that led to this conflict and the escalation of the confrontation, as well as in long-term stability. This can only be achieved through a complex solution to the problem.

What I think follows from all this is that if Russia is willing to compromise and accepts Trump’s offer to freeze the conflict, which is currently emerging, the intense phase of the war could end relatively quickly. If this is not the case, the war will continue after 2025, as decisions will have to be made on the battlefield. Do you agree with this?

Russia is forced to solve this problem by military means, namely within the framework of the special military operation. The conditions for this have been created by the West under the leadership of the United States. We must solve this problem somehow, and we will solve it. If Ukraine and the West are not ready to conduct substantive negotiations that take into account the realities and Russian interests and focus on resolving the causes of the conflict, then we will do it differently. For example, the issue of Ukraine’s neutrality and NATO membership cannot be avoided.

Even demilitarisation, which in my opinion is perhaps the most important issue today, cannot be avoided…

All elements of the causes of the conflict are important, and I emphasise again that the problem must be solved in a complex way.

Do you agree that Donald Trump’s proposed solutions, as we know them so far, are not aimed at this but at freezing the conflict, and that this is hardly acceptable for Russia?

Unfortunately, I cannot say that I know what Trump wants.

This is how it looks to many of us...

This comment is not only about resolving the conflict in Ukraine, but about addressing global challenges in general. Trump is not an easy person. He proved this during his first term as president, and we cannot ignore the fact that he is forced to act within the framework of the US political system, where the president, although he has a fairly broad mandate, cannot ignore certain interests that often limit his scope for action. So we do not know what proposal Trump will come up with. If he is serious, it will be checked against the criteria mentioned above.

But every element of the offer will have to be carefully thought out and checked, because the history of NATO-Russia relations is full of lies. They lied when they promised after German reunification that NATO would not expand eastward. They failed to fulfill the disarmament agreements and then blamed Russia for it. They lied when they voted in the UN Security Council for a no-fly zone over Libya and then used it to destroy the country, and they continue to lie about the conflict in Ukraine, starting with the Minsk agreements. How can we still believe the West’s promises?

What happened in Syria surprised many and embarrassed Russia, which supported the Assad regime. To what extent could this situation affect the conflict in Ukraine?

I am confident that the situation in Syria can ultimately be resolved through negotiations. Russia has been supporting this for years within the framework of the Astana process. As for the possible impact on the conflict in Ukraine, I would not link the two. To push this is a gross exaggeration, the two conflicts should not be confused.

We started with the United States, so let’s end the interview there. Where do you see the United States on the global stage in about twenty years?

The United States will still be a great power, but only one of them. What is happening in the world today is an objective process, so it is in Washington’s interest to take into account the realities and accept the changing balance of power, rather than creating an enemy image. In comparison, in 2017 Washington declared China an enemy by law, and this approach defines its geopolitical ambitions. This is not right, and I can only hope that the United States will eventually come to terms with a new world order that is more democratic and fair, based on mutual respect and balance. The United States must find its real place in this world, as only by doing so can it achieve lasting success. This requires a change in the current mentality, which rests on the belief in perpetual US supremacy and the proclamation of being a unique and exceptional nation.

We have seen this in history, and we have seen where it has led…

That’s right. God forbid it happens again! We have a difficult and bumpy road ahead of us, but I am optimistic and confident that humanity will overcome this and that the new balance of power will bring stability to the world.

---

Thanks for reading. Putting out high-quality journalism requires constant research, most of which goes unpaid, so if you appreciate my writing please consider upgrading to a paid subscription if you haven’t already. Aside from a fuzzy feeling inside of you, you’ll get access to exclusive articles and commentary.

Thomas Fazi

Website: thomasfazi.net

Twitter: @battleforeurope

Latest book: The Covid Consensus: The Global Assault on Democracy and the Poor—A Critique from the Left (co-authored with Toby Green)