Moldova: pro-EU government turns increasingly authoritarian

The EU is actively interfering in the country’s internal affairs, tolerating state violence and repression when it serves the purpose of expanding and consolidating its influence

Translation of an article by Gert-Ewen Ungar originally published in German in NachDenkSeiten.

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At the beginning of July, the first EU-Moldova summit took place in the capital of Chisinau, Moldova. In addition to Moldovan President Maia Sandu, the summit was attended by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and EU Council President Antonio Costa.

The summit lasted just over two hours. However, this short time was still enough to present Moldova with a comprehensive cash gift. Moldova is to receive €1.9 billion over the next few years. According to Adam Riese, this equates to around €792 for each of the 2.4 million Moldovans. The EU had already agreed on this gift to Moldova in March. Now, the handover of a first tranche was staged with great pomp and circumstance.

The money is to be used to finance the implementation of reforms that will integrate Moldova more closely into EU structures. €270 million was disbursed directly at the summit. This will finance a hospital and provide relief for electricity customers in light of high energy prices. Von der Leyen promised several other benefits as well. For example, money transfers home by Moldovans working in the EU are to become cheaper. The EU also wants to make phone calls from EU countries to Moldova more affordable by integrating the country into the EU roaming network.

Alongside all these gifts and benefits, there is, of course, also a warning: Russia intends to destabilise Moldova and interfere in the parliamentary elections scheduled for September.

This also explains why the EU is currently showering Moldova with its cornucopia of aid. It is a case of active interference ahead of the elections. The EU is openly doing exactly what it accuses Russia of. Von der Leyen and her colleagues are so convinced of their own legitimacy in this interference that they no longer even notice the blatant contradiction. In Brussels, there is absolute certainty that the EU not only has the right to bind Moldova more closely to itself economically, but also to integrate it into the EU’s security and defense structures — even if this provokes Russia. Russia, for its part, is simply expected to accept the destabilisation of the European security architecture. The EU is ready to turn Moldova into a second Ukraine.

To this end, the controversial EU policy of the increasingly authoritarian government of Maia Sandu is to be supported and perpetuated. However, it is doubtful that this policy is in the interests of the majority of Moldovans. In a referendum last October, a razor-thin majority voted in favor of EU integration — but the 50.46% “yes” votes were achieved only through systematic discrimination against the diaspora living in Russia and simultaneous preferential treatment of Moldovans living in the EU. For the estimated one million Moldovans living and working in Russia, there were only two polling stations and an insufficient number of ballots.

It’s also questionable whether Moldovans will actually have anything to vote for in September. The opposition party of businessman Ilan Șor was already banned in 2023. The governor of the autonomous region of Gagauzia, Evghenia Guțul, is under house arrest, and prosecutors are demanding nine years in prison for allegedly illegally financing political activities. The “Romania” model is setting a precedent.

Guțul also belonged to the Șor party. An opposition alliance, Pobeda (Victory), has since formed, which also includes Ilan Șor and Evghenia Guțul. Due to the increasing repression in Moldova, the opposition alliance’s congress took place in Moscow at the beginning of July. The alliance intends to participate in the parliamentary elections in September, but assumes that the authorities will exclude Pobeda from the elections. Pobeda aims to promote good relations with Russia and Moldova’s integration into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In addition to Russia and Belarus, the defence alliance currently includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is, of course, the exact opposite of what the EU is striving for. A ban on the party bloc is therefore more than likely.

Sandu’s pro-EU stance is increasingly sparking protests, which the police are responding to with increasing brutality. The most recent example is police violence against demonstrators who tried to prevent a Gay Pride march.

The EU is also promoting the presence of its values in Moldova and supporting LGBT organisations, without considering local sensitivities, traditions and established value systems. A proposed Gay Pride event for June was initially banned by the mayor of the capital, Chisinau. However, President Maia Sandu approved it nonetheless. Two other events took place at the same time: an Orthodox procession and a demonstration for traditional family values. After the Orthodox Christians attempted to prevent the LGBT Pride demonstration from proceeding, massive police violence was used against them and ultimately against the demonstrators for family values.

It is doubtful that such actions will boost Moldovans’ sympathy for the EU. The fact that Sandu is resorting to such measures suggests that she believes she has sufficient support to push through her course of EU integration, even against the will of the Moldovan people.

In Moldova, we see through a magnifying glass the path the EU is taking. The EU is actively interfering in the country’s internal affairs, tolerating state violence and repression when it serves the purpose of expanding and consolidating its influence. President Maia Sandu is increasingly distancing herself from democracy and the rule of law. Yet this not only is met with approval from Brussels — it is actively supported. In this way, Moldova becomes a blueprint for the EU’s future.

[Update: on July 15, the European Council imposed restrictive measures against the Victory/Podeva political bloc and several close associates of Ilan Șor. Those listed are subject to an asset freeze. It is also prohibited to make available funds or access economic resources to them, either directly or indirectly. Additionally, a travel ban applies to the natural persons listed, preventing them from entering and transiting through the territory of the EU].

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Thomas Fazi

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