The Kursk incursion: crossing Russian red lines while preparing for peace talks?

Kyiv’s objectives are an incongruous mixture of preparing for peace talks and winning permission to cross “imaginary” Russian red lines

Guest post by Matthew Blackburn, senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), specialising in the politics of Russia and Eurasia.

Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast has produced some spectacular optics. The headlines spoke of “the first major invasion of Russian territory since World War Two” and Putin’s “fury” or “humiliation”. Western journalists rode with Ukrainian soldiers into Russia. Ukrainian flags were raised on Russian territory. But other than boosting morale and winning international media attention, what can Ukraine achieve with its Kursk incursion?

The much-cited Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has decided to “refrain from commenting” on Kyiv’s aims so as to protect “Ukrainian operational security” — a stance it continues to hold. Then, after being tight-lipped, official statements emerged from Kyiv on the purpose of the operation. The first is to inflict losses that may force Russia to divert forces to Kursk. President Zelensky has stated the offensive is about “destroying the logistics of the Russian army and draining their reserves […] to inflict maximum damage on all Russian positions”.

Thus, with a relatively small-scale offensive into a sparsely populated region of little strategic value, Ukraine hopes to impel Russia into a reaction that would interfere with its current approach. Yet, according to Kyiv’s own statements, Russia has hundreds of thousands of reserve troops. Why would they need to move forces from the Donbass to Kursk? Indeed, Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast continue and they are not weakening their prioritisation of offensive operations in this sector. A key risk for Ukraine is their Kursk operation will only accelerate the fall of the strategically critical town of Pokrovsk, endangering Ukraine’s long-held defensive lines in Donetsk Oblast.

The second objective, stated by Zelenskyy only on August 19, was to create a strategic “buffer zone”. This signals an intention to build defensive lines and hold the territory that has been seized. Reacting to the incursion, Russian drones and missile attacks are now inflicting losses on Ukraine. Russian ground reinforcements are arriving. There is little reason to expect a costly head-on assault to expel Ukraine from Kursk; Russia will stick to its attritional approach. In military terms, a Ukrainian withdrawal from Kursk to regroup and attack elsewhere, makes some sense. However, in political terms, this would be hard to sell after the recent presentation of Ukraine’s territorial gains in Russia as a victory.

The third aim, outlined by presidential aide Mykhailo Podolyak, is to improve Ukraine’s position in future negotiations. Zelenskyy refers to an “exchange fund” which Ukrainian forces expand by capturing land and POWs in Kursk Oblast. However, it hard to see how seizing a chunk of Russian territory suddenly puts Kyiv in the driving seat in negotiations. Putin has stated that, as the “Kyiv regime” has launched indiscriminate attacks on civilians (in Kursk) and threatened nuclear power stations, there is now no basis for negotiations. The Washington Post reports that indirect talks between Russian and Ukraine, scheduled to take place in Qatar this month, have now been cancelled. Moscow denies any such plans existed. In any case, it is clear the Russian leadership sees the Kursk gambit as an escalation and a step away from talks. In their negotiation stances Ukraine and Russia have changed places; Moscow is now refusing negotiations while Kyiv is signalling its readiness.

If Kyiv’s officially stated aims appear risky or unrealistic, reading between the lines reveals two other objectives. The first is to destabilise Russia by sowing chaos and confusion with a surprise attack on a poorly defended sector of the front. Kyiv has again demonstrated its willingness to use military operations not to achieve strategic aims but to shape immediate perceptions. With the evacuation of citizens and a declaration of a state of emergency in the border oblasts, the narrative of Russian weakness, corruption and incompetence is back with a vengeance. Putin is embarrassed and the Russian military is not all powerful. Or so the story goes.

The second purpose is to show Ukraine is fighting fit and simply needs more weapons and a free hand to use them in attacking Russian territory. The call to “untie Kyiv’s hands” and green-light strikes deep into Russian territory has been heard across 2023 and 2024. What is new is to allow this in future combined-arms land offensives into Russian sovereign territory. Most ominously, the Kursk operation is used as evidence that Russia’s red lines can be crossed without consequence. As Zelenskyy put it, “the naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines […] has crumbled apart in these days”. Thus we are back to the claim if the West gives Kyiv a free hand and ignores Russia’s red lines, Ukraine will “prevail” — and there is no serious escalation risk. As the Pentagon is still evasive on backing this approach, it would appear Washington is less than enthusiastic and fears Russian reprisals in the Middle East at a sensitive time as it brokers a Gaza ceasefire.

All in all, Kyiv’s objectives are an incongruous mixture of preparing for peace talks and winning permission to cross “imaginary” Russian red lines. The ambiguity of Ukraine and its Western allies is mostly likely an attempt to create “strategic dilemmas” for Russia and disrupt their military planning and operations. It remains to be seen if Russia will be compelled to alter its existing methodical and grinding approach to clearing Donetsk Oblast or destroying Ukraine’s power grid.

Russia still does not declare war on Ukraine and Russian gas still flows through Sudzha to EU member states. Moscow has not chosen to react in an escalatory manner — so far. Given the possible prizes of Ukrainian defensive lines collapsing in the Donbass, or an energy blackout causing economic meltdown and another huge outflow of Ukrainians, Russians has little reason to deviate from its current approach. Putin is unlikely to follow calls in Russia to “remove any taboo” in attacking Ukraine.

Meanwhile, in the short-term, the likelihood of negotiations is now much lower. We can expect months of more intense fighting. Ukraine has more cards it can play to hurt Russia but needs permission to escalate. The Kursk incursion has highlighted the unpredictable risks inherent to this war as it enters its final stages.

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Thomas Fazi

Website: thomasfazi.net

Twitter: @battleforeurope 

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