The myth of Western liberal democracy
Democracy is being dramatically undermined — not by “populists” or “foreign adversaries” but by Western elites. But did we ever really have democracy in the first place? Or was it always a façade?
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I’ve written for UnHerd a long reflection on the state of democracy in the West. As censorship becomes routine, dissent is increasingly criminalised, propaganda becomes ever more blatant, legal systems are weaponised to suppress opposition — and entire elections are annulled because they deliver the wrong outcome, as we saw in Romania — can we still speak of democracy? But, more importantly, did we ever really have democracy in the first place? Or was it always a façade?
Here’s an excerpt:
Democracy is about something far more substantial than the mere act of voting. If it means anything, it must surely allow citizens to influence the state’s direction and shape the political agenda on fundamental issues — whether it be immigration, foreign policy or the overall trajectory of social and economic policy. Few today would seriously claim that such a form of democracy exists today: even though we can still (at least for now) cast our vote, many would likely agree that our actual ability to influence political outcomes is extremely limited. Fundamental decisions often seem to be made elsewhere, by forces operating behind the scenes — economic powers, permanent bureaucracies, security apparatuses and supranational institutions. Yet that still leaves one more question: if “real democracy” is now dead, was it ever alive at all?
For a relatively short period — roughly between the Forties and the Seventies — we did witness a form of democracy that was decidedly more substantive than what exists today. Over these decades, often described as the “golden age” of capitalism, the working classes were integrated into the West’s political systems for the first time in history. This allowed them to gain a significant influence over the political agenda, leading to a substantial expansion of social, economic and political rights, in a context of growing politicisation of the masses. The contrast to the post-political period is very stark indeed.
All the same, it’d be wrong to idealise the mid-century West. Even then, democracy in its substantive sense remained heavily constrained. Though the ruling classes were forced — under pressure from popular movements, the Cold War, and the threat of social unrest — to extend voting rights and acknowledge a range of political and social rights, they did not do so willingly. On the contrary, they were often driven by the fear that the masses could pose a real threat to the established social order — that workers might use democracy to overturn existing power relations.
As a result, alongside economic concessions, Western elites also constrained democratic participation in various ways. Modern constitutional systems — including nascent supranational ones like the European Court of Justice, established in 1952 — explicitly limited popular sovereignty. Elected governments were prevented from enacting certain economic or social policies, or even challenging existing international alliances. All the while, power shifted. Parliaments got weaker, and technocrats and judges grew more powerful, each in their way proving capable of overriding national laws. This was often justified as a way of protecting democracy from what elites feared could be the irrational or destabilising demands of the masses — a longstanding argument in liberal political thought that equates too much popular participation with the risk of populism, mob rule or economic irresponsibility.
In some countries, the concept of “militant democracy” became a further means to limit the popular will. In Germany, for example, it legitimised the banning of political parties, most notably the country’s Communist Party. State authorities, supported by media and institutional elites, systematically repressed demands for deeper democratisation, whether via police force, media delegitimisation or institutional restructuring. Meanwhile, Western “permanent states” — the military, intelligence and security apparatuses — exercised considerable influence behind the scenes, generally under the direction of the US. That infamously included terrorist acts aimed at curbing the power of left parties and movements, for example through Gladio. In short, from the very beginning of modern liberal democracy, the ruling classes actively worked to contain democracy within the boundaries of what they deemed acceptable politics.
All the same, for a while, the organised power of the masses was indeed able to constrain, to a greater degree than ever before, the power of capital. As noted, however, this brief period of relative substantive democracy depended on a unique confluence of factors. As these conditions crumbled from the mid-Seventies, the marriage between capitalism and democracy dissolved.
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the symbolic end of this era. In the decades since, we have witnessed a steady erosion of democratic norms — a process that has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Relevant, here, is Carl Schmitt’s “state of exception”, whereby constitutional safeguards are suspended to impose decisions unachievable via normal democratic channels. Yet as the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben emphasised over 20 years ago, the state of exception has now become a permanent condition in Western states.
This, of course, is a paradox: if it is permanent, then, by definition, it is no longer a state of exception. It becomes the rule. But is this permanent state of exception unique to the “post-democratic” era? An analysis of the postwar era suggests not. Rather, it is a fundamental characteristic of the state itself, even in its liberal-democratic guise.
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Putting out high-quality journalism requires constant research, most of which goes unpaid, so if you appreciate my writing please consider upgrading to a paid subscription if you haven’t already. Aside from a fuzzy feeling inside of you, you’ll get access to exclusive articles and commentary.
Thomas Fazi
Website: thomasfazi.net
Twitter: @battleforeurope
Latest book: The Covid Consensus: The Global Assault on Democracy and the Poor—A Critique from the Left (co-authored with Toby Green)
In the specific case of the USA, during the post war decades, some what counter intuitively, the USA was de-democratizing while at the same time democratizing as certain people (like black people in some big areas of the country) who werent given full access, were being granted full access. You touch on things when you write about how its not just about the vote, in the USA, to some extent in its early decades, but mainly from the 1820s until some point after ww2, we used to have genuinely democratic governance structures that granted o just the vote but also direct participation, it did this through formal state structures, but mostly through other things such as policy variability and publicly accessible mass-member political parties. And, again in the case of the USA, in regards to you worrying that the conditions that enable democracy are absent today, the conditions that led to to democracy developing are actually quite similar to the conditions today, and I even overhear young people sometimes making statements regarding the technical-mechanical design of capital markets, back in the 1820s, that is how our story began
What is democracy? Most people have a very incomplete idea of how the world works. Politics is to a large extent convincing people that what you want to do will work and is beneficial to the country. I once had a teacher who explained democracy as a choice between different sections of the elite. For centuries Western "democracy" was a choice between conservatives and liberals. One representing the landowners and "old money" and the other merchant and industrials. It is a strange phenomena of our times that such distinctions seem to have disappeared. All the main politicians come now from the same networks: WEF, Rhodes and German Marshall scholarships, etc. The bottom-up mechanisms that used to produce politicians no longer work like they used to.
The presence of the Soviet Union and its communism was very beneficial for Western democracy as it proved that another approach was possible. It is possible that China will fulfill a similar role in the future but for the moment too few people take it as a serious alternative.