The Western threat to Moldova's future

How the population of a constitutionally neutral country is fighting to preserve its sovereignty against the US and EU, and their local lackeys

Tomorrow, October 20, 2024, the Republic of Moldova will hold the first round of its presidential elections. Political forces seeking to preserve the country’s neutrality have complained about the EU’s approach to the war in Ukraine, which has de facto eliminated any distance between the EU and NATO through the bloc’s sanctions policy and the militarisation of its political and economic processes. The population of a constitutionally neutral country is fighting to preserve its sovereignty against part of its own political elite. An analysis by the former Hungarian ambassador to the Republic of Moldova, György Varga.

Originally published in German on NachDenkSeiten.

During the term of office of the current head of state, Maia Sandu, citizens from neighboring Romania have become the absolute majority in the state administration of the Republic of Moldova. According to available sources, the following people have Romanian citizenship:

• the head of state,

• the president of Parliament,

• the prime Mminister,

• the Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• the vast majority of ministers and members of parliament of the ruling party,

• most heads of state offices,

• the members of the Constitutional Court,

• the head of the secret service.

I want to be clear: at the individual level, multiple citizenship is a human rights issue, but at the state level, it is a matter of national security. It is the responsibility of the power elite to balance these two interests, protecting the interests of the state as an overriding principle.

The director of the Moldovan secret service is not only a Romanian citizen, but was also an employee of the George Soros Foundation from 2013 to 2020. Ideologically and existentially, he is linked to the global West and its goals for the post-Soviet space, and as a Romanian citizen, he has sworn to defend the national interests of NATO member Romania.

Moldovan opposition: Western-backed Romania threatens Moldova’s neutrality and statehood

The efforts to dismantle Moldovan statehood are not surprising in the context of the personnel policy mentioned above. Although the Constitution has established “Moldovan” as the state language since 1994, the Constitutional Court, composed of Romanian citizens, declared this article of the Constitution unconstitutional. As a result, in 2023, the Parliament passed a language law establishing Romanian as the state language:

• The prime minister, who is a Romanian citizen, presented the law,

• the deputies with Romanian citizenship passed it,

• the president of the Republic with Romanian citizenship announced it,

• the head of the secret service, who is a Romanian citizen, monitors those who do not like it, according to the principles learned at the Soros Foundation.

The power elite did not care about the resistance of society: in the 2024 census, despite pressure from the government, 53 percent of the population declared Moldovan and 23 percent Romanian as their language. The remaining third — Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Gagauz — also declared Moldovan as the official language of their state.

What would happen in Switzerland, which is also neutral, if the highest state offices were occupied by such a proportion of French citizens — while no German citizen could hold such offices? Would Germany have accepted the neutrality of such a Switzerland during the historical turbulence of the last two hundred years? No. By the same token, Russia also no longer accepts the Republic of Moldova as neutral in terms of the content of its political practice.

Multiethnic, multilingual Republic of Moldova with historical regions

The separatist territory of the Republic of Moldova is the “Transnistrian Republic” with its capital Tiraspol and a population of about 450,000. A third of them each have Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan citizenship. The society is similarly ethnically divided, and linguistically predominantly Russian-speaking. Since the region never had a common history with Romania, the population of the region separated in 1991-1992 from the Republic of Moldova, which was then dominated by political forces pushing for unification with Romania. In the spring of 1992, fighting broke out after an armed intervention by the central government, which was ended by the Russian contingent stationed there. There are about 2,000 Russian soldiers stationed in the area, whom Tiraspol sees as a guarantee of security.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has established a mission in Moldova to help the parties resolve the status of Transnistria within Moldova. A large part of society today questions the mission’s independence from the interests of the major powers: in the period from 1993 to 2024, it had ten heads, nine of whom were American, and today the mission is also headed by a US diplomat. This fact also raises questions within the OSCE: among 57 participating states, in thirty years, US candidates have won the position in nine out of ten cases (!).

The Gagauz minority of 135,000 people living in the south of the country enjoys an exceptional territorial autonomy in Europe. In the process between Romanian unionists and independence supporters in the 1990s, lawmakers included in the constitutional guarantees of territorial autonomy the possibility that Gagauzia could decide its future if Moldova’s status as an independent state were to change, in order to prevent a repeat of the separatism that has already taken place in Transnistria. This constitutional right is increasingly being invoked, as the loss of Moldovan statehood through unification with Romania has become a goal for some and a real threat for others.

During her four-year term, president Maia Sandu, unlike her predecessors, had no contact with the leader of the separatist region and maintained very poor relations with Gagauzia. According to her critics, the head of state has not sought cooperation with the two regions in special situations (Transnistria and Gagauzia). She therefore sees both regions as the main obstacle to integration with the West, as the former are interested in the Republic of Moldova maintaining its statehood and neutrality without suggesting unification with Romania. Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, confirmed this in his speech on October 9: “The European future of the Republic of Moldova must not be held hostage by the unresolved conflict”.

Western-backed government considers neutrality outdated

The country, which gained independence in 1991, actively participated in cooperation with the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in the early 2000s the rapprochement between the EU and Chișinău [the capital of Moldova] began. The relatively balanced rivalry between the two vectors was present from the very beginning. Ensuring the exclusive assertion of one vector became the main trend only from 2020 due to the Moldova policy of the global West, which thinks in terms of geopolitical expansion.

The militarisation of the Republic of Moldova has been going on since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Since the country with a population of 2.5 million has only Romania and Ukraine as neighbours, whose military potential outweighs Moldova’s by several orders of magnitude, its militarisation by NATO serves solely to dismantle neutrality. Logistically, the country has become a staging point for the global West: according to former head of state Igor Dodon, part of NATO supplies from Romania reach Ukraine via the Republic of Moldova. Since 2022, dozens of military exercises with troops from NATO countries have been held in Moldova.

The US, NATO and the EU are depriving the Republic of Moldova of the guarantor of its statehood — neutrality

The situation is similar to the one leading up to the war in Ukraine: in 2008, NATO violated Ukraine’s sovereignty when it designated it as a future NATO member in the Bucharest Declaration, without taking into account its constitution and its declaration of independence on perpetual neutrality. There was no social support for NATO membership in either Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova: both multiethnic, politically and linguistically divided societies were aware of the consequences — civil or outright war — of an announced NATO membership.

In Bucharest, Moldova’s neutrality is seen as the main obstacle to unification, so it is perfectly understandable that it is committed to dismantling it. In Romania, statements are being made more and more frequently that confirm the fears of the Moldovan opposition. According to leading Romanian politicians, the war in Ukraine offers an opportunity and it is necessary to invade Moldova in time: “When the Russians reach Odessa, Romania, with the support of its allies, should implement the unification of the two countries on the German model”.

Moldovan government undermines cooperation with traditional partners

The war in Ukraine has exacerbated this trend, and the government’s anti-Russian actions are well documented by the corresponding EU sanctions. Since the beginning of the war, the Moldovan government has had no relations with its Russian counterpart, while other international actors have been given special opportunities to influence Moldova’s domestic and foreign policy.

Following the EU’s example, the Moldovan government has suspended flights to Russia and money transfers, despite the fact that more than 500,000 of its citizens work in Russia. The militarisation of Europe and the EU is alarming for the Moldovan population, which is dependent on Russia in many ways and has common interests in all areas of life.

According to former head of state Igor Dodon, over 10,000 Western non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operate in Moldova, while sources from the post-Soviet space and Russian media have been banned by the government. This happened despite the fact that the role of the US and Western Europe seems negligible in terms of a common past, language, culture, religion, kinship and friendship. Russian-language news broadcasts are unavailable and internet algorithms allow searching in Russian only among sources supportive of the Western narrative, despite the fact that the Russian language is protected by the constitution — as a lingua franca among all ethnic groups in Moldova.

The new name for censorship is the fight against Russian disinformation, which is unacceptable in a constitutionally neutral country for a population that generally uses the Russian language. The fight against alleged disinformation is seen as a means of gaining Western control over Moldovan statehood. The US, Georgian and Hungarian laws protecting sovereignty serve as a model for some political forces in the Republic of Moldova: foreign funding should be transparent, and foreign actors should not decide the future of sovereign countries through elections. The Moldovan power elite — as the beneficiary — has no interest in such an arrangement, and moreover, the global West would not allow transparency in the relationship between the funds it provides and political influence. This is evidenced, for example, by the pressure exerted by the US and EU on the Hungarian and Georgian governments, as recently demonstrated by the European Parliament’s October 8 resolution condemning Georgia.

Elections for the head of state — an inventory

Eleven people have been registered as candidates for the post of head of state. Among the candidates are the current head of state Maia Sandu (with the support of the ruling Action and Solidarity Party) and ten opposition candidates, such as former prosecutor general Stoianoglo, candidate of the Socialist Party, former prime ministers Ion Chicu and Vasile Tarlev, former governor of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia Irina Vlah, opposition politician Renato Usatîi and well-known media personality Natalia Morari.

40 percent of the working-age population lives abroad and had until September 6 to register to vote. Logically, most people registered from Russia (38 percent), followed by those living in Italy (11.5 percent), then Germany (9 percent), the United States (6.6 percent) and Romania (5 percent). Despite this, only two polling stations are open in Russia, while there are 60 in Italy, 26 in Germany, 20 in France, 17 in the United Kingdom, 16 in Romania, 16 in the United States, 11 in Spain, 10 in Ireland and six in Portugal. OSCE election experts are likely to classify the election as “free and fair”.

Maia Sandu wants a simultaneous referendum on the EU accession of the Republic of Moldova

The ruling elite makes no secret of the fact that the referendum on EU accession could have a mobilising force behind the current leader, who has already enjoyed the support of the political West throughout her term. The opposition sees the timing of the referendum as a tool to influence the elections, since a fundamental motivation for all Moldovan citizens is an EU standard of living that may be achieved at some point, although they have certain fears.

The militarisation of Europe and the EU is alarming for the Moldovan people, who are dependent on Russia in many areas and have common interests in all spheres of life. Moldovans see that even neutral Austria, as an EU member, is forced to pursue a foreign and security policy that calls into question the very essence of its constitutional neutrality. For years before becoming members of NATO, Finland and Sweden were unable to pursue a neutral foreign policy, as is already the case in the Republic of Moldova (mandatory participation in sanctions, joint declarations, militarisation).

The problems of Moldovan society have been significantly exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, and Brussels’ statements on the escalation of the war do not make the EU any more attractive. Energy prices have risen alarmingly as a result of the sanctions. Ukraine has committed to stop allowing Russian gas to pass through its territory from 2025. This puts gas supplies to the Republic of Moldova, including the breakaway region of Transnistria, in question. The immune system of state sovereignty has already been weakened by citizens of the neighboring country in high Moldovan state offices with the support of the political West.

Moldova’s neutrality and statehood increasingly depend on the restraint of the political West, which is a rather weak guarantee. In the October 20 elections for head of state, one candidate is running with the support of the global West, namely the current head of state. Ten candidates are running with opposition party programs or individual programs (in favour of a neutral country thriving between East and West). Together they have much more support than the current head of state, who is seeking another term. The question is whether the ten opposition candidates for the post of head of state will be able to form a common platform and rally their voters behind the candidate who will reach the second round on November 3, or whether the process of abandoning Moldovan statehood will continue under Maia Sandu.

Romania plays a proxy role in the expansion of the West in the Republic of Moldova

The US is developing the Mihail Kogălniceanu air base, 100 km from the Moldovan border, into the largest US base in Europe, which will be twice the size of Ramstein in Germany. This is part of a $2.7 billion project that aims to provide the US with permanent strategic access to the Black Sea region. The scale of the investment leaves no doubt about the importance of the US strategic goals in the region, which Romanian diplomacy is effectively using. It is achieving its Moldovan goals with US and EU funds, and EU projects: the elimination of Moldovan neutrality and statehood in the interests of the global West, in order to conquer more territory near Russia.

On October 8, the European Parliament (EP), referring to the report of the head of the Moldovan secret service, a Romanian citizen, adopted a resolution condemning foreign interference in the internal and foreign political processes of the Republic of Moldova, in particular in the presidential and referendum campaign on October 20.

As readers have probably guessed, it was not Romanian interference that was condemned, but Russian interference and that of “Putin’s friends” — i.e., the leadership of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia. According to the EP statement, the sovereignty, statehood and neutrality of the Republic of Moldova must be protected from these people. Poor MEPs; how could they know that the people of Gagauzia love their homeland much more, and defend the neutrality and statehood of Moldova better, than some of the representatives of the political elite mentioned at the beginning of this article?

This is how the decent, good-natured, hard-working Moldovan people, who deserve a better fate, can be deprived of their national identity — which part of the country’s power elite doesn’t even believe exists — of the name of their state language, and of neutrality (and then statehood). We have already allowed Ukraine to be broken up in pursuit of Western interests. Now it is Moldova’s turn.

Dr. György Varga was the Hungarian ambassador to the Republic of Moldova from 2008 to 2012 and head of the observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Russia from 2017 to 2021.

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Thomas Fazi

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