Before the Euro, Germany had a strong currency (the Mark), France had a less strong one, and Italy a weak one, subject to frequent devaluations. A good analogy is that of shoes : with the Euro, all countries must run the race with the same size of shoes. So the shoes are a perfect fit for Germany; much too small for France and even smaller for Italy... Unsurprisingly this doesn't work equally well for every country.
The fact is that the USA itself changed drastically during the decades that followed WW2 and took the path that it had rejected (the Bank War and then the defeat of a US party called the Whigs) in the early mid 19th century.
In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node. Unfortunately, this was largely nullified by a set of actions and changes in the post WW2 decades. But beneath the surface there are signs that the ghosts of the past may be stirring.
Also unfortunately, and relatedly, post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
I just want to mention a big son of a bitch behind italian Lira devaluation, not a coincidence, not certainly just speculating but a political designed plan by US and today we can well say it with today knowledge of what happened and who did make it happen: George Soros anybody?
No strategic devaluation is a big plus for the Euro, in my little red book. "Devaluation" is just newspeak/libspeak for "let's make workers pay for big companies' competitiveness".
The huge problem with that kind of critique is that, unless you live in a microstate, e.g. Singapore or Hong Kong, you ALWAYS have different regions with different economic needs. When Italy had the Lira, the Lira did not work the same way for Northern Italy (export oriented, low unemployment, high salaries area) and Southern Italy (high import, high unemployment, low salaries area). However none ever asked to have two different (or more) Liras. None asks for half a dozen dollars for all the different areas of the USA (Silicon Valley and Manhattan have very different needs from Alabama), or for Russia, or for China, or for any other nation really, where this problem is even stronger than it is in Europe.
A weak currency can be a problem, no matter your policy; a strong currency never is, if you have good policies.
Thomas is arguing differently - one size in the EU clearly doesn't fit anything or anywhere - it might suit Germany an exporting behemoth but not Greece or Portugal - a nation with it's own currency is more agile and more able to deal with external shocks.
The UK would have been a terrible member of the euro - it wouldn't/couldn't work - in 2016 when the UK tried to put the break on euro integration, we knew what was happening in regard to Qualified Majority Voting and being constantly ( well neatly) outvoted by Eurozone countries - the EU /Eurozone have much in common ( tragically not all good) - but it effectively meant that the UK could never be full member of the EU given the semi tragic direction of the eurozone -which is now emerging.
Nobody pretends that devaluating the Euro would help; the Euro must simply go away, and national currencies make a comeback.
The problem is that generally, no one in Paris really complains about paying taxes to build roads in Corsica. Even Germans didn't complain that much to pay for the former DDR. Though they paid dearly, it's not enough, as most Ossies are extremely unhappy with the economic situation, and 35 years and countless billions euro later spent, are still in a much worse situation than their Western compatriots (and vote en masse for AfD as a result).
However, Germans and Dutch aren't ready to pay taxes to finance Romania or Estonia. Not at the required scale, anyway. The problem is like German reunification, but at a continental scale. It can't work. It won't work.
Well said, thats why the turn of path in American history (and in other places, by overlapping shepherds) during the post war decades has been disastrous, and far more disastrous than it may appear now because its been papered over domestically by the extractive structures of capital "G" Globalization; and the disasters that has done in other places are of the same program since it is a common economic zone, governance space, and indeed just a common System
In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node. Unfortunately, this was largely nullified by a set of actions and changes in the post WW2 decades. But beneath the surface there are signs that the ghosts of the past may be stirring.
Also unfortunately, and relatedly, post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
Well written and interesting essay. In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node. Unfortunately, this was largely nullified by a set of actions and changes in the post WW2 decades. But beneath the surface there are signs that the ghosts of the past may be stirring.
Also unfortunately, and relatedly, post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
"...The EU’s alignment with US policies, particularly on Ukraine and China, has exacerbated its energy crisis and industrial decline. High energy costs and ineffective tariffs have further weakened industrial competitiveness. This has exacerbated the EU’s economic and geopolitical marginalisation...."
Yes, but here the media are complicit and the people are completely asleep.
For example how many people raised a stick when this obvious self-harm agreement to be a NATO stooge (see below) was signed some years ago, by UNELECTED European stooges whio had been installed by the US? No better yet, how many even KNEW it was signed, or do know even today?
I haven't read all of your article yet but my first thought is that the European Union should have remained a trading partnership (maybe a bit like BRICS). The Common Market was formed just after the war I think out of the Coal and Steel Union. Britain joined in 1973 as I recall and soon after many of our beautiful apple orchards in southeast England were dug up because they weren't competitive due to the varying size of the apples. There were also these crazy meat, butter and other "mountains" and wine lakes as they call them or was it milk lakes? I can't remember now. It all seemed crazy then and it sure is crazy now. Perhaps it should have stayed as the original six countries that formed it in the first place, but then the politics crept in and it became what it is today. A frigging disaster.
Correct Kathryn - the EU ( as it be became) was founded and designed, effectively by socialists ( Monnet, Schumann, Salter) - the Common Agricultural Policy was for the benefit of French, German and Dutch farmers and had c. 70% of all EU (then EEC) spending - Actually, one thing De Gaulle got right - we ought never to have been allowed to join.
Maastricht was the straw that broke the camels back for me and the creation of the European Monetary System that led to the Euro.
The great democratic deceit, which was known at the time, was that anyone entering the euro became a vassel of the EU possibly with the exception of Germany for whose benefit ( & France) it was created.
The Euro Commission might indeed be technocrat but the ECB broke Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain ( PIIGS) - once in the Euro, you are owned by Frankfurt & Brussels - had the UK not voted for Brexit when it did, we would inexorably have been forced to join the Euro - not many are jumping with joy to join that cesspit currently.
This is a powerful critique, and fully agreed that Europe’s structural malaise stems not from “too little integration” but from the very nature of the supranational project itself. The euro has acted less as a unifying force than as a straitjacket, stripping member states of the ability to respond flexibly to shocks while entrenching the power of technocratic institutions. What I would add is that this isn’t just an economic failure but a civilizational one. Europe has surrendered the ability to think strategically in terms of production, industry and sovereignty, at the very moment when the global order is being reshaped by state-led industrial policies in Asia and beyond.
Historically, great powers that subordinated their productive base to external constraints, whether Britain’s over-reliance on finance in the 20th century or Eastern Europe’s dependence on rigid supranational empires, eventually lost both autonomy and influence. By clinging to the EU model, Europe risks repeating this pattern, condemning itself to geopolitical irrelevance in a multipolar world. A looser framework of cooperation among sovereign states, capable of tailoring policies to national needs while coordinating where interests align, would not only restore flexibility but also reconnect Europe to the traditions of statecraft that once made it dynamic.
I live in a country with money transfers without a say about the money spend. After decades the receiving region has made no economic improvements and it put a strain on the paying region.
This is how I see the EU, a zero sum game. Eastern countries receive money and have more growth, also billion of euros from immigrant workers flow back to their home country east, billions leaving the Western countries. Also jobs left the rich economies for the poor. The problem I see with those money transfers is that the gained growth east goes at the expense of the west. Germany pays billions annually, billions not used for innovation, education, lower taxes, infrastructure,... Becoming number one is difficult, staying number one is even harder. This is how the rich EU economies lost there position. Combine that with bad economical and energy decisions and you end up in a downward spiral.
Not an economist but lets say you have 5 countries each eating 1 million cookies, integrating all countries might not lead to eating more cookies. Yes we can have more choice, take overs, lower price, more profit. I see trade as a good thing but consumers have only so much to spend, if I buy Irish beef it's one EU steak less, I'm not eating more steaks as I can't afford it.
But in general politics are rotten to the core, justice and media is corrupt. We have a system of career politicians with no accountability and a carrousel of incompetence. A lot is wrong with our current system.
Nationhood is meaningless when you have a fascist superpower turning Canada into the USA, Panama into the USA, the Palestinian coast line into the USA, Greenland into the USA, Western allies into vessel states of the USA
I could continue Thomas but you get my drift. Europe should unit and buffer itself from being usurped into being the USA. Your thinking is flawed....see the big picture or meld into being the USA. USA. USA. USA.
Well written and interesting essay. In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node.
Post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
Non si tratta solo di problemi finanziarii ma di qualcosa di assai più grave: l'U.E. è lo strumento nelle mani dei governi degli U.S.A., o meglio, di chi li manovra, con il quale ci rapinano, ci minacciano, ci controllano. Bisogna prenderne atto, ormai.
Before the Euro, Germany had a strong currency (the Mark), France had a less strong one, and Italy a weak one, subject to frequent devaluations. A good analogy is that of shoes : with the Euro, all countries must run the race with the same size of shoes. So the shoes are a perfect fit for Germany; much too small for France and even smaller for Italy... Unsurprisingly this doesn't work equally well for every country.
I can understand this as an analogy and you are correct.
What is it that we have done in Europe? The answer is we have tried to be like the US.
Does not work in Europe mostly because we do NOT all want the same?
We do not want the same because we aren't the same. What's in common between Portugal and Estonia ?
Exactly. Dismantle the EU
The fact is that the USA itself changed drastically during the decades that followed WW2 and took the path that it had rejected (the Bank War and then the defeat of a US party called the Whigs) in the early mid 19th century.
In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node. Unfortunately, this was largely nullified by a set of actions and changes in the post WW2 decades. But beneath the surface there are signs that the ghosts of the past may be stirring.
Also unfortunately, and relatedly, post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
well said!
I just want to mention a big son of a bitch behind italian Lira devaluation, not a coincidence, not certainly just speculating but a political designed plan by US and today we can well say it with today knowledge of what happened and who did make it happen: George Soros anybody?
No strategic devaluation is a big plus for the Euro, in my little red book. "Devaluation" is just newspeak/libspeak for "let's make workers pay for big companies' competitiveness".
The huge problem with that kind of critique is that, unless you live in a microstate, e.g. Singapore or Hong Kong, you ALWAYS have different regions with different economic needs. When Italy had the Lira, the Lira did not work the same way for Northern Italy (export oriented, low unemployment, high salaries area) and Southern Italy (high import, high unemployment, low salaries area). However none ever asked to have two different (or more) Liras. None asks for half a dozen dollars for all the different areas of the USA (Silicon Valley and Manhattan have very different needs from Alabama), or for Russia, or for China, or for any other nation really, where this problem is even stronger than it is in Europe.
A weak currency can be a problem, no matter your policy; a strong currency never is, if you have good policies.
Thomas is arguing differently - one size in the EU clearly doesn't fit anything or anywhere - it might suit Germany an exporting behemoth but not Greece or Portugal - a nation with it's own currency is more agile and more able to deal with external shocks.
The UK would have been a terrible member of the euro - it wouldn't/couldn't work - in 2016 when the UK tried to put the break on euro integration, we knew what was happening in regard to Qualified Majority Voting and being constantly ( well neatly) outvoted by Eurozone countries - the EU /Eurozone have much in common ( tragically not all good) - but it effectively meant that the UK could never be full member of the EU given the semi tragic direction of the eurozone -which is now emerging.
Nobody pretends that devaluating the Euro would help; the Euro must simply go away, and national currencies make a comeback.
The problem is that generally, no one in Paris really complains about paying taxes to build roads in Corsica. Even Germans didn't complain that much to pay for the former DDR. Though they paid dearly, it's not enough, as most Ossies are extremely unhappy with the economic situation, and 35 years and countless billions euro later spent, are still in a much worse situation than their Western compatriots (and vote en masse for AfD as a result).
However, Germans and Dutch aren't ready to pay taxes to finance Romania or Estonia. Not at the required scale, anyway. The problem is like German reunification, but at a continental scale. It can't work. It won't work.
Nor Italians at all
Well said, thats why the turn of path in American history (and in other places, by overlapping shepherds) during the post war decades has been disastrous, and far more disastrous than it may appear now because its been papered over domestically by the extractive structures of capital "G" Globalization; and the disasters that has done in other places are of the same program since it is a common economic zone, governance space, and indeed just a common System
In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node. Unfortunately, this was largely nullified by a set of actions and changes in the post WW2 decades. But beneath the surface there are signs that the ghosts of the past may be stirring.
Also unfortunately, and relatedly, post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
Well written and interesting essay. In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node. Unfortunately, this was largely nullified by a set of actions and changes in the post WW2 decades. But beneath the surface there are signs that the ghosts of the past may be stirring.
Also unfortunately, and relatedly, post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
"...The EU’s alignment with US policies, particularly on Ukraine and China, has exacerbated its energy crisis and industrial decline. High energy costs and ineffective tariffs have further weakened industrial competitiveness. This has exacerbated the EU’s economic and geopolitical marginalisation...."
Yes, but here the media are complicit and the people are completely asleep.
For example how many people raised a stick when this obvious self-harm agreement to be a NATO stooge (see below) was signed some years ago, by UNELECTED European stooges whio had been installed by the US? No better yet, how many even KNEW it was signed, or do know even today?
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/874309/EU-NATO%20declaration_EN.pdf
Signed at Brussels on 10 January 2023;
Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European
Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
«…… We will
further mobilize the combined set of instruments at our disposal, be they political,
economic or military, to pursue our common objectives to the benefit of our one billion citizens»
I haven't read all of your article yet but my first thought is that the European Union should have remained a trading partnership (maybe a bit like BRICS). The Common Market was formed just after the war I think out of the Coal and Steel Union. Britain joined in 1973 as I recall and soon after many of our beautiful apple orchards in southeast England were dug up because they weren't competitive due to the varying size of the apples. There were also these crazy meat, butter and other "mountains" and wine lakes as they call them or was it milk lakes? I can't remember now. It all seemed crazy then and it sure is crazy now. Perhaps it should have stayed as the original six countries that formed it in the first place, but then the politics crept in and it became what it is today. A frigging disaster.
Correct Kathryn - the EU ( as it be became) was founded and designed, effectively by socialists ( Monnet, Schumann, Salter) - the Common Agricultural Policy was for the benefit of French, German and Dutch farmers and had c. 70% of all EU (then EEC) spending - Actually, one thing De Gaulle got right - we ought never to have been allowed to join.
Maastricht was the straw that broke the camels back for me and the creation of the European Monetary System that led to the Euro.
The great democratic deceit, which was known at the time, was that anyone entering the euro became a vassel of the EU possibly with the exception of Germany for whose benefit ( & France) it was created.
The Euro Commission might indeed be technocrat but the ECB broke Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain ( PIIGS) - once in the Euro, you are owned by Frankfurt & Brussels - had the UK not voted for Brexit when it did, we would inexorably have been forced to join the Euro - not many are jumping with joy to join that cesspit currently.
tl;dr you are an irrevelant faggot, no one cares about your anti-eu vomit, so go fuck yourself turd worldist contrarian shitstain retard.
This is a powerful critique, and fully agreed that Europe’s structural malaise stems not from “too little integration” but from the very nature of the supranational project itself. The euro has acted less as a unifying force than as a straitjacket, stripping member states of the ability to respond flexibly to shocks while entrenching the power of technocratic institutions. What I would add is that this isn’t just an economic failure but a civilizational one. Europe has surrendered the ability to think strategically in terms of production, industry and sovereignty, at the very moment when the global order is being reshaped by state-led industrial policies in Asia and beyond.
Historically, great powers that subordinated their productive base to external constraints, whether Britain’s over-reliance on finance in the 20th century or Eastern Europe’s dependence on rigid supranational empires, eventually lost both autonomy and influence. By clinging to the EU model, Europe risks repeating this pattern, condemning itself to geopolitical irrelevance in a multipolar world. A looser framework of cooperation among sovereign states, capable of tailoring policies to national needs while coordinating where interests align, would not only restore flexibility but also reconnect Europe to the traditions of statecraft that once made it dynamic.
Such a lovely clip! Obviously someone is instructing the dogs to bring the cat into the frame and they duly comply!
I live in a country with money transfers without a say about the money spend. After decades the receiving region has made no economic improvements and it put a strain on the paying region.
This is how I see the EU, a zero sum game. Eastern countries receive money and have more growth, also billion of euros from immigrant workers flow back to their home country east, billions leaving the Western countries. Also jobs left the rich economies for the poor. The problem I see with those money transfers is that the gained growth east goes at the expense of the west. Germany pays billions annually, billions not used for innovation, education, lower taxes, infrastructure,... Becoming number one is difficult, staying number one is even harder. This is how the rich EU economies lost there position. Combine that with bad economical and energy decisions and you end up in a downward spiral.
Not an economist but lets say you have 5 countries each eating 1 million cookies, integrating all countries might not lead to eating more cookies. Yes we can have more choice, take overs, lower price, more profit. I see trade as a good thing but consumers have only so much to spend, if I buy Irish beef it's one EU steak less, I'm not eating more steaks as I can't afford it.
But in general politics are rotten to the core, justice and media is corrupt. We have a system of career politicians with no accountability and a carrousel of incompetence. A lot is wrong with our current system.
Nationhood is meaningless when you have a fascist superpower turning Canada into the USA, Panama into the USA, the Palestinian coast line into the USA, Greenland into the USA, Western allies into vessel states of the USA
I could continue Thomas but you get my drift. Europe should unit and buffer itself from being usurped into being the USA. Your thinking is flawed....see the big picture or meld into being the USA. USA. USA. USA.
Got it!
Well written and interesting essay. In the United States during the 1830s, the nation consciously stood at a fork in the road between two radically different state formation logics. One was the Henry Clay style “American System,” which aimed to bind the continent by imposing continental divisions of labor, aligning each region to a specialized economic role, coordinated by powerful centralized institutions, national credit, and elite policy‐making networks, in short, economic central planning. The other was the Jacksonian republican path, a multi-tiered, federated system that diffused economic and political power downward, cultivated redundancy across all spheres (economic, scientific, institutional), preserved local agency and institutional pluralism, and “bound” its vast territory not by forced specialization but by creating many centers of productive power all actively trading with one another. This produced both cohesion and dramatically higher broad-based economic dynamism without collapsing sovereignty into one central node.
Post WW2, and then, more importantly, post advent of Globalization, Europe unfortunately chose (or, I should say, the European peoples had it chosen for them) to pursue something much closer to the former, not a genuine federated system, but a technocratic, centralized arrangement whose internal logic more closely resembled the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, centrally coordinated economic blocs, harmonized regulations, and policy spheres designed to suppress political variability in the name of “integration.” Thus, the project carried a structural rot from the beginning, and when it finally got into the air with enactment of the Schengen and the Lisbon treaties producing dependency, vulnerability to shocks, and democratic brittleness, because it internalized the very logic of managed continental division of labor that Jacksonians had rejected in the 1830s as unfit for a truly democratic, pluralistic polity
Serious question: why not using GDP, PPP?
Reference: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=EU-US
Europe is the USA.
Everything I know from here in France: NO difference between countries, all marketable goods are the same.
I do notice that Italy is doing (not badly) because they are courageous, artistic people.
France forgot what they were good at (and it isn't food). Painters/artists were a phenomenon now the French know nothing about art. Why is that?
Non si tratta solo di problemi finanziarii ma di qualcosa di assai più grave: l'U.E. è lo strumento nelle mani dei governi degli U.S.A., o meglio, di chi li manovra, con il quale ci rapinano, ci minacciano, ci controllano. Bisogna prenderne atto, ormai.